A “receiver” is reasonably well understood in the art as a name for a structure which performs the recited function. “The term ‘receiver’ (i.e., [in] the absence of the term means) presumptively connotes sufficiently definite structure to those of skill in the art” to avoid a means-plus-function interpretation. The opinion also walks through a litany of other elements that have been found to connote sufficiently definite structure to avoid invoking § 112, ¶ 6, including a “height adjustment mechanism,” a “computing unit … for … evaluating …,”a “circuit,” a “digital detector,” and a “detent mechanism.” This is therefore a good case to consult when arguing against a means-plus-function interpretation. With regard to the disclosure requirements for a priority application, it is not necessary that the priority disclosure expressly describe the structure of a well-known element (such as a “receiver”) to provide the benefit of an earlier priority date.
Background / Facts: The application on appeal here from the PTO is directed to a self-powered switch that can be used to turn on and off lights, appliances, and other devices without a battery or a connection to an electrical outlet. The claims at issue recite a “receiver” that is for or otherwise adapted to perform receiving of certain radio frequency signals. A foreign application to which the present application claims priority mentions a “receiver” only in passing, stating that a plurality of radio frequency telegrams “are received by a single receiver and the latter initiates the corresponding actions (lamp on/off, dimming of lamp, etc.).”
Issue(s): (1) Whether a “receiver” element is merely defined in terms of functional language, thus creating no difference between a “receiver” and “receiving means” so as to invoke § 112, ¶ 6, and (2) whether the priority disclosure must expressly describe the structure of the receiver to provide the benefit of an earlier priority date.
Holding(s): No on both accounts. (1) “The term ‘receiver’ (i.e., [in] the absence of the term means) presumptively connotes sufficiently definite structure to those of skill in the art.” Given the “demonstrated familiarity that one of skill in the art would have with a ‘receiver,’” it is not simply a “black box that performs a recited function.” The court also emphasized that it was “not persuaded by … arguments that the term ‘receiver’ is simply too broad to recite sufficiently definite structure. We have stated previously that just because ‘the disputed term is not limited to a single structure does not disqualify it as a corresponding structure, as long as the class of structures is identifiable by a person of ordinary skill in the art.’” (2) “[A] person of ordinary skill in the art could understand the bounds of the invention merely by reading the term ‘receiver,’ which is present in [the priority] applications. In requiring that the [priority] applications ‘expressly describe the structure of the receiver,’ the Board applied an incorrect standard. … Since the inventors did not invent the receiver, and the Board found that the structure was well known as of the filing date, the inventors were ‘not obliged … to describe … the particular appendage to which the improvement refers, nor its mode of connection with the principal machine.’ … ‘This enables patents to remain concise statements of what is new, not cumbersome repetitions of what is already known and readily provided by reference.’”