INFO-HOLD, INC. v. APPLIED MEDIA TECH. CORP. (Fed. Cir. 2015) (P) – Use of the term “preferred” implies that alternatives are contemplated

Use of the term “preferred” when describing example embodiments implies that alternatives are contemplated. Here, for example, the mention in the specification of a “preferred” receive-only manner of communication was found to imply the invention’s ability to operate...

TEASHOT LLC v. GREEN MOUNTAIN COFFEE ROASTER (Fed. Cir. 2015) (NP) – Silence with regard to a certain aspect of the invention does not depart from consistent teachings elsewhere

Silence in a particular example with regard to a certain aspect of the invention cannot be used to depart from consistent teachings about that aspect elsewhere in the specification. Here, for example, a figure that did not show any details of container entry or exit...

WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC (Fed. Cir. 2014) (P) – (1) Terms of mere preference such as “preferably” and “exemplary” indicate that a feature is not required & (2) the term “module” connotes either hardware or software structure and is not a nonce word per se

(1) Terms of mere preference such as “preferably” and “exemplary” may be used in the specification to indicate that a particular feature is not required. Here, for example, the disclosure of an “exemplary” display that “preferably” depicts a classroom map was found to...

EPOS TECHNOLOGIES LTD. v. PEGASUS TECHNOLOGIES LTD. (Fed. Cir. 2014) (P) – Use of terms such as “preferably” or “typically” can distinguish examples from the greater invention

Use of terms in the specification that clearly set apart specialized examples from the greater invention as a whole—even when at least non-exclusively conveying partiality, such as the terms “preferably” or “typically” here—can be used to avoid an inference that all...

AMERICAN RADIO LLC v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED (Fed. Cir. 2014) (NP) – Interpretation of a claim term in accordance with its consistent use in specification is not improper

Particularly in situations where a given claim term does not have a commonly accepted plain meaning in the art to which it pertains, consistent use of the term in the written description may be sufficient to inform its meaning without improperly importing limitations...